1. Opinion of Others

302. As to the third article [n.285], it is said [cf. Henry of Ghent infra], according to Boethius On the Hebdomads, that “what a thing is by and what it is are diverse,” because that which a thing is ‘by’ is called its ‘ratification’, and that which it is ‘what it is’ by is called its ‘somethingness’ [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 11 q.3]. On this understanding it is said that the respect of footprint in a creature is not founded on the ratification of the thing, but only on its somethingness, and it [sc. the respect of footprint] is formally the ratification of it [ibid., 5 q.6, 11 q.3].a

a.a [Note by Scotus, cf. Ord. II d.1 qq.4-5, n.17] This is important in the second book, in the question about the relation of a creature to God.

303. The way of positing it is this: according to Avicenna Metaphysics 5 ch.1, “humanity is only humanity;” therefore the idea of humanity is not the ratified thing; therefore, humanity must be a ratified thing by something else outside the formal idea of humanity.

304. The argument is also made that what its ratification is formally by is the footprint relation, and this first as follows: whatever is included in the per se understanding of something, insofar as that something is of the sort it is, is that by which it is of that sort, or is the same formally as what it is insofar as it is of that sort; but the respect of footprint is included in the idea of any ratified being;     therefore etc     . Proof of the minor: there is a being that is ‘to be’ itself, as is God; there is a being that ‘to be’ belongs to, as is every other being besides God, which is not of itself ‘to be’ but only a being to which ‘to be’ belongs [cf. Henry, Quodlibet 5 a.2, Summa a.2 q.6]. From this the argument goes as follows: any being that is not of itself ‘to be’, but is that to which ‘to be’ belongs, is not a ratified being save by participating that very ‘to be’, or insofar as it does participate that very ‘to be’ [cf. n.109]; everything other than God is that to which ‘to be’ belongs and is not ‘to be’ itself;     therefore it is not ratified save to the extent it participates ‘to be’; therefore by that participation is it formally ratified.

305. Secondly [cf. n.304] as follows: nothing other than God can be perfectly known without knowledge of all the intrinsic and extrinsic causes, Physics 1.1.184.14-17, “Then each thing etc     .” [Henry, Summa a.1 q.5]; but if the essence of anything of this sort were absolute and were not to include a respect essentially to an extrinsic cause, it could be perfectly known without knowledge of the extrinsic cause; therefore it is necessary that it include such a respect [ibid., a.27 q.1].

306. Augustine On the Trinity 8.3 n.4 is brought in here [“you will see God, not good with another good, but the good of every good.” Cf. Henry, ibid. a.24 q.8].

307. Again, Boethius On Hebdomads , “If little by little you take away, through the intellect, the good itself, then, though there may be good things, yet they will not be good by the fact that they are.”     Therefore , the idea of good is taken away from them when the first good is, through the intellect, taken away; and consequently goodness in them states a relation to, or participation in, the supreme good.

308. If argument is made against the opinion [n.302] from Averroes Metaphysics 12 com.19, that relation has the weakest being, so there is not and cannot be a ratification formally of ratified being [Henry, Quodlibet 9 q.3 etc     .] - the reply is made that relation is double: one accidental, one substantial. And this distinction of relation is taken from Simplicius On the Categories (‘When’), where he maintains that some cases of ‘in’ do not constitute categories as other things do, because of the fact that some respects are essential or substantial, some are not but accidental [Henry, ibid. Henry, Quodlibet 9 q.3, “The reason why ‘being in’ does sometimes constitute a proper category is because, namely, that which is in another is not completive of that in which it is, and because it could subsist as separate without something else in which it is. For when either of these is lacking ‘being in’ does not constitute a proper category.” ⁴⁰]. They say, therefore, that the statement of the commentator [Averroes] is true of accidental relation, not of substantial relation.

309. And if it is objected that every relation presupposes a foundation in ratified being, therefore it is not itself the ratification of the foundation [nn.295, 323] - the reply is made that this is true of a relation that comes to a foundation, but not of a relation that constitutes a foundation.